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SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR, bank deposits as a whole
have increased sharply, with the rise in business deposits being
particularly marked. Between the end of December 1939 and
September 1944 adjusted demand deposits of all commercial banks
in the United States increased by 120 percent.According to
surveys' by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
about 63 percent of all demand deposits of banks on July 31, 1944
were held by domestic business enterprises. This figure indicates
the paramount importance of cash balances held by business, since
a large part of such balances consists of demand deposits.
Cash balances give rise to serious problems, two of which are
noted here. First, since the cash balance policy of business enter-
prise determines the rate of turnover of a large part of demand
deposits, it can greatly affect the volume of payments and thus
pose difficult problems for monetary management, particularly
in the immediate postwar period.Second, the use of the cash
balances of business has important implications at the present
time for the financing of the war: The greater the amount of cash
that business holds in addition to what is necessary for its opera-
tions, the smaller the amount of government bonds that business
buys and, therefore, the greater the amount of bonds the govern-
ment has to sell to individuals or to the banks.
It would be wrong, however, to assume that the importance of
the behavior of cash balances is being realized now for the first
time. As far back as the late twenties the cash balance policy
of enterprise attracted attention. Corporations and other business
units then lent part of their cash balances on call to stock exchange
members in order to take advantage of the high call loan rate
which existed at that time. They were accused, rightly or wrongly,
not only of contributing to the boom on the stock exchange by
lending their cash on call, but also of feeding the financial markets
at the expense of the markets for commodities.
In the thirties corporate cash balances again gave rise to heated
1SeeFederal Reserve Bulletin, November 1944,pp. 1069if.
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discussions. During most of this period business allegedly held
"idle" cash, i.e., cash balances in excess of current operating needs.
Some economists accused private enterprise of contributing to the
stagnation of the economic system by holding excess cash balances
(instead of investing them) and thereby counteracting the stimu-
lating effect of deficit financing. Others pointed out that one cannot
expect enterprise in a profit economy to invest unless there is a
reasonable prospect of making a profit.
No matter what stand is taken in these controversies, the mere
fact that they have arisen is proof enough that the cash balance
policy of enterprise must be considered of great importance to the
economic system as a whole. The present study proposes to show
how cash balances held by business actually behaved over the last
three decades, 19 14-43, to analyze why they behaved as they did,
and to discuss some of the implications of the present cash balance
position of business.Chapters 2-6aredevoted to a detailed
analysis of the period between the two wars, 19 19-39, and Chap-
ters 7-9 deal with developments in World Wars I and II. The
discussion is centered around manufacturing corporations, but a
short analysis of the cash balances of trade is undertaken in
Chapter 10.
The study is based primarily on compilations of annual financial
statements of samples of manufacturing corporations in two size
groups, large corporations (over $5milliontotal assets) and
medium-sized and small companies ($50thousandto $5million
total assets). A description of these samples, which were collected
in connection with the Financial Research Program's Studies in
Business Financing, is presented in Appendix A.2
Assets of our sample of 78 large manufacturing corporations
amount to some 40 to 45percentof the assets of all large manu-
facturing corporations in the country. The assets of our sample
of 73 medium-sized and small manufacturing corporations, on
the other hand, constitute a very small part of the total assets of
all medium-sized and small However, all the evi-
dence that could be gathered —suchas the behavior of other
2Thesesamples have been used in other studies in thisseries.See Albert R.
Koch, The Financing of Large Corporations, 1920-39, and Charles H. Schmidt and
Ralph A. Young, The Effect of War on Business Financing: Manufacturing and
Trade, World War I (both studies, National Bureau of Economic Research, Finan-
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samples of medium-sized and small manufacturing corporations,
which are available for a limited number of years —indicatesthat
the direction of the movement shown by cash balances of our
sample does typify their size class.3
For our trade samples the numbers of corporations included
are small. Although for trade as a whole no generalizations con-
cerning the liquidity position of corporations can be made from
an examination of our samples, a comparison of the movements
of the cash balances of our frade samples and those of the manu-
facturing groups seems warranted.
SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
Does the behavior of corporate cash balances over the period
1919-39 show a definite pattern and, if so, what are the fact6rs
determining this pattern? How have the first and second World
Wars influenced the movement of corporate cash balances? These
are questions that the present study attempts to answer. To this
end cash balances (and cash balances plus marketable securities)
are examined in relation to the work they have to do, i.e., to
payments; therefore, the ratio of cash (and of cash plus market-
able securities) to payments plays the central role.Also, the
relation of cash balances to other items of the balance sheet is
examined and the factors behind this relation are analyzed. In
addition, the movements of corporate cash balances are studied
against the background of changes in the total means of payment,
of which cash balances form a part.
The reader must be warned that the following summary gives
only a broad outline of the findings of the study. Not all the
results could be indicated in a summary of a few pages; neither
could necessary modifications of these results l?e stated here, nor
all the terms be defined.
In the first four years of World War II the total means of
payment in the United States increased by 78 percent whereas
cash holdings of the sample of large manufacturing corporations
used in the present study rose by only 47 percent. Furthermore, if
the cash holdings of these corporations are related to their pay-
ments, it is found that the ratio of cash (average of two successive
3Fora more detailed statement see C. H. Schmidt and R. A. Young, o/.cit.,
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year-end figures) to payments in 1943 was not much higher than
that in 1937, when the ratio was the lowest of any year since 1929.
On the basis of these standards of comparison, it cannot be said
that large manufacturing corporations had any "excess" cash
liquidity in 1943.
A different result is obtained if all liquid funds (cash plus
marketable securities)are related to payments. The ratio of
liquid funds to payments in 1943 was considerably above the 1937
ratio, which was the lowest in the entire period, 1916-43. But in.
1943 factors were present which necessitated a higher liquidity of
corporations, the most important of them being increased tax
liabilities.If these various factors are taken into account,it
appears that large manufacturing corporations in 1943 had not
increased their liquidity beyond what was necessary to provide for
expected payments. This does not mean that at the end of the
war when reconversion sets in on a large scale they cannot draw
on cash or marketable securities for the purpose of reconversion;
these two types of assets will have increased further in 1944 and
some of the factors that necessitated a high liquidity position in
1943 may disappear after the war, or at least diminish in im-
portance. 'Whether their marketable securities and cash, together
with what the corporations may expect from the government fol-
lowing contract termination and under various provisions of the
income and excess profits tax law, are sufficient for reconversion
needs cannot be precisely estimated. It is not possible to predict
with any accuracy the extent to which corporations may draw
funds from the capital market and the banks during the period
of reconversion.
World War I is the period in which corporations, under the
impact of the various war loan drives, bought marketable securi-
ties on a large scale for the first time, and marketable securities
have continued to be a significant item up to the present among
corporations' assets. At the end of War I the liquidity
position of large manufacturing corporations was higher than at
the beginning, whereas the reverse was true for large trade corpo-
rations.Yet not only the latter but also large manufacturing
corporations relied on outside funds to finance plant expansion and
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Duringthe twenties large manufacturing corporations appear
to have held no more cash than was required by their volume of
transactions. The ratio of cash to payments (and also cash plus
marketable securities to payments) rose sharply in the depression
years of the early thirties, fell from 1933 to 1937, and then rose
again in 1938, a year of business contraction.In other words,
the velocity of circulation of the cash balances of large manufac-
turing corporations was relatively stable in the twenties, declined
in the depression after 1929, rose in the upswing of 1934-37, and
fell again in 1938.
Thus in the years of business contraction during the thirties,
the large manufacturing corporations held what in this study is
called, for lack of a better name, "free" cash (or "free" liquid
funds if marketable securities are included), i.e., cash (or cash
plus marketable securities) that is not tied up by the volume of
transactions. in the technical jargon of the monetary economist,
they hoarded money. The movement of thisinactive money
shows an inverse correlation with the profit rate of the large
companies. A primary reason, though not the only one, for this
accumulation of "free" funds during 1930-33 is that the large
manufacturing corporations were largely independent of bank
credit in the year 1929 so that the reduction of their bank debts
did not absorb the "surplus" cash which they accumulated, as a
result of the depression, chiefly through liquidation of inventories
and receivables. This situation is in marked contrast to that in
1921 when the large manufacturing corporations were heavily
indebted to the banks and no "free" cash made its appearance.
These comparisons suggest that in a system in which business is
not indebted to the banks to any great extent —i.e.,in whid'i
deposits are created or canceled through the purchase or sale of
government securities —businessfluctuations may reflect them-
selves not in an increase or decrease of bank loans and deposits
but in a change in the velocity of circulation of deposits and,
perhaps, in a change in ownership of deposits between consumers
and enterprise.
In order that the holdings of "free" cash by large manufac-
turing corporations during the thirties may be placed in their true
perspective, it should be mentioned that the increase in cash hold-
ings never absorbed in any year more than 3.6 percent of the6 CorporateCashBalances, 1914-43
total cash receipts of the companies, and that the decrease never
financed more than 2.7 percent of the cash payments. There was
always a net contribution to the cash balance on current account,
i.e., the difference between receipts from sales and operating ex-
penditures wasalwayspositive.Nonoperating expenditures
(mainly dividends and expenditures on fixed equipment) were
always greater than cash receipts from sources other than sales
(mainly cash receipts through increases in funds from outside).
On noncurrent account there was therefore a drain on the cash
balance, which was financed mainly by the surplus of cash receipts
on current account.
Large trade corporations present a picture similar to the one
for large manufacturing corporations in so far as the ratio of
cash plus marketable securities to payments is concerned: This
ratio shows a rise in periods of business contraction and a fall
in periods of expansion. But for the large trade group the ratio
of cash alone to payments in the thirties did not display the
inverse cyclical pattern shown by the ratio of cash to payments
for large manufacturing corporations. The contrasting movements
of the ratios of total liquid funds to payments and of cash alone
to payments indicate that the distribution of liquid funds between
cash and marketable securities for trade corporations differed
from that for manufacturing companies. During the present war
years the percentage increases in cash and marketable securities
(particularly the latter) for large trade corporations have been
greater than for large manufacturing corporations. As measured
by the ratio of liquid funds to payments, the liquidity of the trade
corporations in 1943 was exceptionally high, mainly because of a
decrease in receivables and a decline in fixed property, due to
postponement of repairs and replacements.
For medium-sized and small manufacturing corporations the
percentage increases in cash balances and marketable securities
during World War II have been considerably greater than in the
case of the large manufacturing corporations. Since the rise in the
volume of payments for the smaller size group did not keep pace
with the increase in liquid funds between 1939 and 1943,
their ratio of liquid funds to payments advanced sharply.In
contrast to large manufacturing corporations the medium-sized
and small manufacturing corporations definitely showed an in-The. Setting and the Findings 7
crease in liquidity. The same is true for medium-sized and small
trade corporations.Thus the group of large manufacturing
corporations is the only one for which the level of liquidity in
1943 was not high.
During periods of business contraction in the thirties tEe in-
crease in "free" cash of medium-sized and small corporations in
both manufacturing and trade was small.Relatively great losses
for these companies and probably also the retirement of bank
debt absorbed the liquid funds that would otherwise have been
accumulated.The phenomenon of"inactive"or "hoarded"
corporate cash in the thirties is thus mainly one of large manu-
facturing corporations.
If the cash balance is considered in relation to other items of
the balance sheet, it is found that in periods of business contraction
during 1914-43 companies added to their cash balance through
partial liquidation of inventories and receivables, and (with a
time lag) through the postponement of replacements for fixed
equipment. Most of the additional cash obtained in this way
was paid out of the business, mainly by distribution of dividends
which were not currently earned and by reduction of debts. When
bank debts were of no particular importance and losses small, the
cash balance tended to rise in relation to other assets during
periods of business contraction, and to fall during periods of
expansion. This cyclical pattern was traced by large manufac-
turing corporations in the thirties, but at no time during the
period studied was it followed by medium-sized and small manu-
facturing concerns.
Cash balances of the corporate universe followed the general
cyclical pattern shown by the totalmeans of payment in the period
1926-36. In other words, the ratio of cash balances of all manu-
facturing and of all nonfinancial corporations (available since
1926) to the total means of payment was relatively stable during
those years. Corporations neither gained cash at the expense of
other cash holders nor lost cash to the rest of the cash holders
to any marked degree.
A comparison of the movement of the cash balances of the
samples of manufacturing corporations used in this study and that
of the cash balances •of all manufacturing corporations indicates
that the behavior of the cash balances of the subgroups into whichB Corporate Cash Balances, 1914.43
manufacturing corporations may be divided differs widely.In
particular, cash balances of large manufacturing corporations
showed the impact of the contraction period 1930-33 only in so
far as their increase was retarded; cash balances of all manu-
facturing corporations, in contrast, declined. The main reason
for this difference in behavior may be found in the fact that large
manufacturing corporations were not dependent on bank credit.
** *
Inits attempt to explain the influence of money on the eco-
nomic system the so-called "cash balance approach" of monetary
theory uses as its basic tool the ratio of cash to expenditures.
Economists, who make use of this approach, analyze the factors
determining this ratio for the various groups of cash holders, the
reasons why these factors, and with them the ratio of cash to
expenditures, change over time, and the effects of such changes
on prices and production.
In so far as the present study investigates cash balances of cor-
porations in relation to their payments, it is linked to this broader
field of monetary theory. It is hoped that by analyzing corporate
cash balances over a period of approximately thirty years this
study makes a contribution to our empirical knowledge in this area
of monetary research. At the same time, by throwing light on
the behavior of corporate cash balances over this relatively long
stretch of time, it may help provide a somewhat broader per-
spective for the current widespread discussion of the cash liquidity
of corporations.